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Abstract 
In an earlier paper [3), we examined the nature of individual 
and collective preferences over alternative income tax schedules in 
the context of a simple model in which individuals respond to high tax 
rates by working in an untaxed "sheltered" sector of the economy. 
There we established the social optimality of a linear income tax 
among the set of tax schedules that are continuous, nondecreasing 
convex functions of income. Here we relax the restrictions on tax 
schedules, most importantly allowing schedules to have concave 
(decreasing marginal tax rate) as well as convex (increasing marginal 
tax rate) regions. In fact, we prove that a linear income tax is 
socially preferred to any nonlinear lower semi-continuous tax 
schedule. 
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In an earlier paper [3), we examined the nature of individual 
and collective preferences over alternative income tax schedules in 
the context of a simple model in which individuals respond to high tax 
rates by working in an untaxed "sheltered" sector of the economy. One 
central result established there [Proposition 3.6) was that the 
optimal income tax ( from the point of view of an agent interested in 
maximizing a social wel fare function of the type found in the optimal 
income taxation literature) is always a linear or flat-rate schedule, 
in which all incomes are taxed at the same marginal rate. The 
linearity property does not depend on the distribution of ability or 
the specific form of the social welfare function (though of course the 
parameters of the optimal schedule do depend on these data), so in 
those respects the result is a general one. 
However the analysis in [3) did severely constrain the class 
of admissable schedules (to a subset of the class of continuous, non­
decreasing. convex functions of income, with marginal rates not 
exceeding unity) . These assumptions are restrictive in several 
respects. It would clearly be better to derive properties such as 
continuity or marginal-rate restrictions as consequences of some more 
general principle of fairness or optimality, rather than simply impose 
them as constraints. Further, while these constraints are generally 
satisfied by the kinds of statutory income tax schedules which are 
seen in practice, this is not true of the effective incidence of the 
tax burden, particularly when transfers or other benefits are 
included; this typically varies with income in a complicated, non-
convex fashion (see, for example, [1]). Moreover, from a technical 
point of view, the convexity assumption, in particular, makes the 
generality of the linearity result somewhat suspect. The key part of 
the argument (Propositions 3.4. 3.5) involved showing that any 
strictly convex schedule can be dominated by certain less-convex (or 
2 
linear) ones; hence, within the class of convex schedules, any optimal 
schedule must be linear. But since this optimum occurs on the 
boundary of the set of admissable schedules. it is not clear that it 
would still be optimal in some richer admissable set containing the 
linear schedules as interior rather than boundary members; thus the 
linearity result might well be an artifact of the convexity 
assumption. 
In the present paper, however, we shall show that the 
linearity property is in fact quite general, and remains valid with 
essentially no restrictions on the class of admissable schedules 
(other than lower semi-continuity). (We also relax another assumption 
of the earlier analysis, by permitting the government's revenue target 
to be arbitrary.) The main result to be proven--the Theorem of 
section 4�shows that any non-linear schedule is dominated by a 
certain linear schedule. 
1. Definitions and Assumptions 
We assume a simple one-good economy with a legal "taxable" 
sector, and an untaxed "sheltered" sector. Worker-consumers allocate 
their work effort between these two sectors so as to maximize 
consumption, or after-tax income. A unit of labor pays a (pretax) 
return of 1 consumption unit in the taxable sector, or a lower but 
untaxed return in the sheltered sector. The relative return (or 
"wage") in the tax-sheltered sector, w( L) , is a continuous, strictly 
decreasing function of the total labor supply to that sector, L, with 
w(L) @ (0,1) for all L@ [O,NJ.1 
Each individual supplies a fixed amount of labor to the 
economy. but this amount varies across individuals (or equivalently, 
all supply the same amount but its productivity varies across 
3 
individuals). F(n) is the number of individuals who supply n or fewer 
units. F is nonatomic, and its support is an interval Cn.n] c [0,1]. 
The total amount of labor available to the economy is 
n 
N = Jn · dF(n) > O. 
n 
A tax schedule is a lower semi-continuous function 
T:[0.1] � [-1,+1] which specifies the net tax liability or credit 
T(x) due on the pretax (taxable) income x. Lower semi-continuity 
ensures the existence of an optimal labor allocation for all 
individuals; we place no other restrictions on the form of T, so 
admissable schedules may be discontinuous. increasing or decreasing 
functions of income. or whatever. A schedule is feasible if it 
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satisfies the government's and all individuals' budgets constraints. 
Thus, a feasible schedule is one for which T(x) ix for all x@ (0,1] , 
and RT i G, where RT is the total tax revenue raised by the schedule T
(we show below that this is unique for any T), and G is the 
(exogenously given) government revenue target. 
2. Preliminary Results
Given a tax schedule T and wage w Q (0,1) an individual of 
type n who allocates x @ [0,n] of his work effort to the taxed sector 
and n - x to the untaxed sector earns a post-tax income of 
(1) x - T(x) + w(n - x) -[T(x) - (1 - w) • x] + w • n. 
An optimal allocation is one which maximizes this, or equivalently, 
which minimizes the quantity in square brackets. Let 
,. ,. ,. ,. ,. 
(2)  xT(n;w) • {x a [0,n] : x - T(x) + w · (n - x) l 
x - T(x) + w · (n - x) for I,/ x @ [O, n] }
be the set of allocations which are optimal for n at the wage w, under 
the schedule T. In view of the observation above, evidently 
Comment 1. 
A A A 
x @ xT(n;w) if and only if x minimizes T(x) - (1 - w) · x
over x @ [0,n] . 
,. 
From lower semi-continuity. xT(n;w) is non-empty and compact
for all n, w, T. A more explicit characterization, which will be 
useful below, is as follows: suppose the function T(x) - (1 - w) · x 
possesses a minimum x' on some interval of the form [0,x*>. Let X be
s 
the smallest such minimum (by lower semi-continuity 
x = min{x' = arg min T(x) - (1 - w) · x} is well defined), and let x 
• 
[0.x ) 
define the largest interval on which this is still a minimum (i. e. 
x a sup{x
••
: T(x) - (1 - w) • x 2 T(x') - (1 - w) • x' for all 
x@ co.x··)} .
We shall say the interval lx.x> is �-critical for I. Clearly any T 
and w define a unique (possibly empty) set of disjoint critical 
intervals. 
- A A 
Now for any n@ Cx.x), from Comment 1 evidently x@ xT(n;w) if
A 
and only if T(x) - (1 w) 
A 
A 
x = min T(x)+( l - w) 
x @ [0,n] 
TCx> + (1 - w) • x; thus x = x is always optimal (though not 
necessarily uniquely so) for all such n. For n = x, either 
x = 
T(x) - (1 - w) • x = T(x) - (1 - w) • x. in which case the above 
equality again defines the optima, or else there is a discontinuity at 
x with (from lower semi-continuity) 
A 
T(x) + (1 - w)T(x) < T<x> + (1 - w) · x. so from Comment 1, x = x = n 
uniquely. On the other hand if n does not belong to the closure of 
any critical interval, then it must be true that T(x) - (1 - w) 
has no minimum on rn. ... ' LV,U/ • By lower semi-continuity it must have a 
A 
minimum on [0,n] , which must therefore be at n, so x = n uniquely, 
again by Comment 1. Thus, summarizing: 
A -
Comment 2 .  The correspondence xT is as follows: If n � Cx.xl for 
every w-critical interval Cx.x> , then 
A 
(i) xT(n:wl = {n} .
x 
On the other hand if n @ [K, X) for some such interval, then 
,. ,. ,. ,. 
(ii) xT(n;w) = {x Cl [K, n]: T(x) + (1 - w) • x = T(K) + (1 - w) • Kl,
while for n = x either 
A 
(iiia) xT given by (i) if T is discontinuous at x with
- -
T(x) - (1 - w) • x < T(x) + (1 - w) · K· or 
A 
(iiib) xT given by (ii) otherwise.
The aggregate labor supply to the untaxed sector is 
(3) Jen " A - xT(n;w)]dF(n) e N - XT(n;w); 
n 
this is evidently non-empty and compact (and convex, from Richter's 
- A -
theorem) for all w. If for some wage w there exists an X @ XT(n;w) 
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such that the wage schedule satisfies w(N - X) = w. we shall say w and 
N - X are an equilibrium wage and labor supply for the schedule T, 
respectively. In the Appendix it is shown that for any T such an 
• 
equilibrium necessarily exists, and is unique. We denote by wT and
N - x; the equilibrium wage and labor supply under the schedule T.
From individual maximization, an individual's optimal 
allocations must all yield the same after-tax income. We may thus 
denote by yT(n) the after-tax income distribution induced by T at the
equilibrium wage, where 
(4) 
A 
A A • A A A • 
y1(n) = x - T(x) + wT(n - x) for all x@ xT(n;wT).
Since xT(n;w) is not single-valued, individual before-tax incomes and
taxes paid are indeterminate, in general. However the aggregates are 
7 
unique, since in order to clear the labor market, the individual 
,. 
choices must almost everywhere equal some integrable selection x(n) of 
A * � * xT(n;wT) such that J x(n)dF(n) = IT (here and henceforth we omit
explicit mention of the limits n.n of integration; they are intended 
throughout). Thus aggregate before-tax income is 
f 
,. • ,. 
(5) ZT a [x(n) + wT(n - x(n)]
If we denote by 
(6) YT "' JyT(n)
• • • 
(1 - wT)XT + w.j_.N .
total after-tax income, the total tax revenue collected is then 
( 7) RT "' ZT - YT'
and is again unique. In view of this, the following notion is well-
defined: 
Definition: Two s�hedules T, T' are equivalent if and only if 
(i) 
(ii) 
. ,. 
WT = WT'
RT RT, 
(iii) Ym(n) • 
and 
Ym.(n) for all n . . . 
Since equivalent schedules induce the same after-tax income 
distribution, and raise the same revenue, their welfare implications 
clearly are the same. 
3. Simple Schedules
Let us say a schedule T is simple if 
( 8) T(x) . 
-
T(x) + (1 - wT)(x - x> for all x @  Cx.x), 
• 
for every WT-critical interval lx.x). A simple schedule is thus
• • 
linear, with slope (1 - wT)' over its wT-critical intervals. An
alternative and equivalent characterization is as follows: 
Comment 3. T is simple if and only if 
T(x") - T(x') •(x'' - x') ! 1 - WT 
for all x •, x • • such that 0 i x • < x • • i 1.
Proof. If the inequality holds everywhere it clearly holds (with 
• 
equality) on every WT-critical interval, so T is simple. Conversely,
if the inequality fails for some x•, x••, let x = min{x• @ [0,x'']:
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• • • • 
T(x ) - (1 - wT)x .{ T(x) - (1 - wT)x for all x @  [O,x'')}. Evidently
. -
this defines a WT-critical interval Cx.x> which contains x'', and
• • • T<x> - (1 - wT>x i T(x') - (1 - wT)x' < T(x'') - (1 - wT)x'' 
so T is not simple. QED 
Comment 3 implies, in particular, that the marginal rate of a 
•
simple schedule cannot exceed 1 - wT. Simple schedules have the 
following convenient property: 
Comment 4. If T is simple then yT(n) = n - T(n) for all n.
Proof. Suppose n @ lx.x> for
T is simple, T(n) T(x) + (1
. -
some wT-critical interval lx.x>. Since
• 
wT)(n - x>. so from (ii) of Comment 2 .
A 
x = n is optimal, whence yT(n) = n - T(n) for all such n. If n does
• A 
not belong to (the closure of) any WT-critical interval x = n is also
optimal (uniquely optimal) for n from the rest of Comment 2 ,  
9 
implying the same conclusion. QED 
The importance of simple schedules lies in the following fact: 
Proposition 1. For any T there exists a simple schedule T' which is
equivalent to T. Moreover T' is feasible if T is. 
• 
Proof. We construct T' by linearizing T at over its wT-critical 
intervals. Without loss of generality we can suppose there is just 
one such interval Cx.x>. T' is then defined by 
T'(x) 
• 
T(x) + (1 - wT)(x - x> for all x @  Cx.x>.
T(x) otherwise . 
• • 
Evidently T'(x) - (1 - wT)x = T'<x> - (1 - wT>x for all x @  Cx.x>. and
- . Cx.x> is the unique wT-critical interval of T'. Comment 2 then
implies 
A • 
XT' (n;wT)
,. . 
xT, (n;wT)
I\ • 
xT, (n;wT)
A • 
xT,(n;wT)
A * -lx.nl 3 xT(n;wT) for n @ Cx.x>.
,. . 
{n) = xT(n;wT) for n � [ x , xJ, and either
I\ • Cx.nl � xT(n;wT), or
I\ •
{n) = xT(n;wT)' for n = x. 
I\ • 
Thus x optimal for n at wT under T is also optimal under T' at the
I\ • I\ • . . • • • • . same wage. so XT,(wT) 3 XT(wT), implying WT, =  WT and XT, = XT. This
- . 
implies that Cx.x> is the unique wT,-critical interval of T', and that
T' is simple. 
We next show that both schedules induce the same after-tax 
income distribution. (ii) of Comment 2 implies that for n @  [K,X), 
10 
A * * -
x = K is optimal under T at wT and under T' at at wT, (since [K,X) is
critical in either case) and T'(K) = T(K) by construction, so 
• • 
yT(n) = K - T(K) + wT(n - K) = K - T'(K) + WT,(n - K) = yT,(n).
- A * 
Similarly, for n � [K,xl . x = n is (uniquely) optimal under T at wT
• 
and T' at wT, , and T(n) = T'(n), so yT(n) = n - T(n) = n - T'(n)
YT,(n) for all such n. The same conclusion is readily verified for
n = x, whence yT(n) = yT,(n), all n. 
• • 
Hence YT= YT', and since XT = XT, it follows that aggregate
before-tax incomes. and revenues collected, are also the same, i. e. 
ZT = ZT'' RT= RT'" To show that T' is feasible if T is, it remains
only to show that T(x) � x. all x implies T'(x) � x, all x. This 
follows immediately from the construction of T', since T'(x) = T(x) 
• 
for x, [K,X), and T'(x) = T(K) + (1 - wT)(x - K) � T(x) for
x @  CK.x>. QED 
It is nearly, but not quite, true that every schedule has a 
unique simple equivalent. In particular, if n < 1 the portion of any 
schedule which applies to x @ (n,1] is irrelevant, since taxable 
incomes in this range cannot occur. Thus if T is equivalent to T' as 
constructed above. it is also equivalent to every simple schedule 
which coincides with T' on (0,n]. If we define a "canonical" simple 
schedule as a simple schedule T' such that 
• 
T'(x) = T(n) + (1 - wT,)(x - n) for x > n, however, it follows from 
11 
the construction above that every schedule is equivalent to a unique 
canonical simple schedule. 
In view of this, we may henceforth confine attention to simple 
schedules. 
4. Fairness and Optimality 
Following the optimal taxation literature, we can suppose 
individual welfare to be measured by a continuous, strictly 
increasing, strictly concave function u: [-1.+l] � lR +• the same for 
all individuals, so that u(y) is the welfare of an individual with 
after-tax income y. Social welfare is the sum of individual welfare 
levels, so the social utility of the schedule T is 
f u ( yT(n)) dF(n) .
An optimal schedule is one which maximizes this over the set of 
feasible schedules. Optimality in this sense clearly depends on the 
particular welfare function chosen. and is not invariant under 
monotone (or even concave) transformations of u. However we may 
define a partial or·dering of schedules which is independent of the 
choice of u: in particular, if T and T' are feasible schedules such 
that 
(9) fu<yT(n))dF(n) > fu<yT,(n))dF(n), 
for every (continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave) function 
u, then we can say the schedule T is unambiguously fairer than T'. 
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It is well known that this relationship can be directly 
related to income redistributions. In particular. the following is an 
immediate consequence of Atkinson [2), pp. 245-48: 
Proposition 2 (Atkinson). Let T and T' be feasible schedules such 
. -
that RT = RT, and YT = YT,. If there exists an n 0 Cn,nl such that 
• 
YT(n) 2 Yr,Cnl for all n < n • 
• 
and 
YT(n) i yT,(n) for all n > n • 
with strict inequality on some set of positive (F) measure. then T is 
unambiguously fairer than T'. 
(In fact in the Theorem below. the "unambiguously fairer" 
relationship could alternatively be defined directly in terms of these 
redistributive inequalities, since these are what are used in the 
proof. ) The main result to be established is the following: 
Theorem. If T is a feasible simple schedule which is not linear over 
Cn, nl then there exists a (feasible) linear schedule which is 
unambiguously fairer than T. 
• 
Proof. Let T' = a  + px be the linear schedule with p = 1 - wT and
• 
a = wTN - YT. It is readily verified that this schedule induces the
. � . same equilibrium ([0,1) is WT-critical for T'. so XT ,(wT) = [0,N],
. " . . . . . 
whence XT 0 Xr,CwT)' so wT, = wT and XT, = XT). Hence T' is simple,
• so YT,(n) = n - T'(n) = wT(n - N) +YT for all n (from Comment 4). 
J • • • whence YT, = [wT(n - N) + YT] = Yr • and Rr = ZT - YT = (1 - wT)XT
• 
+ wTN = ZT - YT, =  RT'.
13 
Since T is simple, T(x'') i T(x') 
• 
+ ( 1 - WT) (x' ' - x ') from 
Comment 3, whence 
T'(x") - T(x") 2 T'(x') - T(x') + (1 - w
*
>Cx" - x') T 
for all x" > x•; thus T'(x) - T(x) is nondecreasing on [0,1] . 
Moreover, since T is nonlinear over Cn.nl by hypothesis, there must 
exist n• @ Cn.n> such that 
T'(x) - TCx) > T' Cn> - TCnl for x @  (n' , n). 
Evidently T'Cnl - T<n> 2 o would imply T'(x) - T(x) 2 O for all x > n 
with strict inequality for x > n', which from Comment 4 would imply 
YT, < YT • a contradiction; hence T' Cnl < TCnl. Similarly 
- -
T'(n) - T(n) i O would imply YT, < Yr • again a contradiction, so
- - . -
T'(n) > T(n). Hence there must exist n @ Cn.nl such that 
T'(n) i T(n), whence YT,(n) 2 YT(n) (from Comment 4) for n < 
• 
n • and 
• 
YT,(n) i yT(n) for n 2 n (using lower semi-continuity). Moreover the
inequality must be strict for n sufficiently close to n. or to n. 
Hence T' is unambiguously fairer than T • QED 
From this (and Proposition 1) it follows immediately that 
every optimal schedule is equivalent to a linear schedule. Moreover 
it is straightforward to show that for any u there exists an optimal 
schedule. In particular. if G is not too high there clearly exist 
feasible schedules; hence, from the Theorem. the set L of linear 
simple schedules which are feasible is non-empty, and is easily shown 
to be a compact subset of the parameter space :rn2. Since yT(n) is
bounded, Ju<yT(n))dF(n) has a supremum on L; moreover Ti @ L, Ti � T
implies T@ L. and y .(n) � yT(n) for all n from Comment 4. so theTi 
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supremum is a maximum in L and hence, from the Theorem, in the set of 
all feasible schedules. 
The other results in [3] on optimal schedules also remain 
valid without qualification. In particular, if the wage schedule 
satisfies the regularity condition of Proposition 3.7 the optimal 
(simple, linear) schedule will be unique for any u, and for any 
distribution of u•s, there will exist a linear schedule which is a 
majority equilibrium in the set of feasible schedules.2
APPENDIX 
Here we prove the existence and uniqueness of a market 
" 
equilibrium. In what follows, XT(n;w) = min xT(n;w) • 
" " 
xT(n;w) = max XT(n;w). XT(n;w) = min XT(n;w), and 
- " 
XT(n;w) •max XT(n;w).
Lemma 1. For each n@ [0,1), xT(n;') and xT(n;') satisfy
(i) if w'' i w' then xT<n.w' ') i xT(n,w' ')
i xT(n,w') i xT(n,w'), and 
(ii) x_T(n;') is right-hand continuous, and 
xT(n;·) is left-hand continuous.
Proof. For any w. XT(n,w) i xT(n,w) by definition. For notational
convenience, write xm = xT(n,w'). We show that T(x) - (1 - w'')x
> T(xm) - (1 - w'')xm V x S (xm.n) and thus xT(n,w'') i xm' from 
which (i) follows. If x@ (xm,n), and w'' > w. then x > xm implies
w''x - w''xm > w'x - w'xm' so
T(x) - T(xm) + xm - x + w''x - wxm > 
T(x) - T(xm) + xm - x + w'x - w'xm. so
[T(x) - (1 - w' ')x] - [T(xm) - (1 - w' ')xm] > 
[T(x) - (1 - w' ')x] - [T(xm) - (1 - w')xm].
But xm minimizes T(x') - (1 - w')x' over [0,n], so the right side is
nonnegative. and T(x) - (1 - w'')x > T(xm) - (1 - w'')xm as desired.
15 
We now show that xT(n;") is left-hand continuous; the proof
for XT(n;") is analogous.
16 
- m Let w@ (0,1), write xT(n;w) = x ,  and fix e > O. We must find & such
- m that w'e (w - &,w) implies xT(n;w') - x < e (by (i),
xT(n;w') 2. x
m. I,/ w' < w). Now if xm + e > n then clearly
xT(n,w') x
m + e for all w' < w and we may choose any &, so suppose
xm + s i n.
Let s(e) min 
[xm + e,n]
T(x) - TCxm) 
mx - x 
Clearly s(e) exists, since 
[xm + e,n] is compact and Tlxl - Tlx
m) is continuous. Also,
x - xm 
I,/ x @ (xm,n] T(x) - (1 - w)x > T(xm) - 1 - w)xm. or 
T(x) - T(xm) > 1 - w, so s(e) > 1 - w. 
x - xm 
Let & = s(e) - 1 + w > 0, and let w'@ (w - &,w) = (1 - s(e),w). Then 
m T(x) - TCxm) I,/ xe [x + e,n], m 2. s(e) > 1 - w, or T(x) - (1 - w')x > 
x - x 
T(xm) - (1 - w')xm. So, xT(n;w') < x
m + e and xT(n;") is left-hand
continuous at w. w O (0,1) was arbitrary. so xT(n;") is left-hand
continuous on (0,1). 
Lemma 2. XT and XT satisfy
QED 
(i) if w' • > w' then XT(w') i XT(w') i XT(w' ') i XT(w' '). and
(ii) XT is right-hand continuous, and XT is left-hand continuous.
Proof. For all w@ (0,1), XT(w) = f� �T(n;w)dF(n) and 
XT(w) = f� xT(n;w)dF(n), so (i) follows directly from Lemma 1.
To see that XT is left-hand continuous, let w S (0,1) and let (wj} be
a sequence in (0,w] with w
j 
4 w. Then lim xT(wj) = w
j 
4 w 
fl - Jllim 0 xT(n;wj)dF(n) = 0 w
j 
4 w
Dominated Convergence Theorem) 
lim xT(n;wj
)dF(n) (by the Lesbeque
w
j 
4 w 
= � xT(n,w)dF(n) (by Lemma 1) = 
XT(n;w). A similar argument shows that XT is right-hand continuous.
17 
QED 
Recall that an equilibrium is a pair (w, N - X) satisfying
- "' -
X @ XT(n;w) and w(N - x> = w.
Proposition O. For any tax schedule T, a market equilibrium (w,N - X) 
exists and is unique. 
Proof. As noted in the paper (following (3)) XT: (0,1) 44 [O,NJ has
"' -
nonempty compact, convex values. Hence XT(w) = [!T(w),XT(w)J I,/ w, so
"' 
by Lemma 2 XT clearly has closed graph (it is upper hemicontinous and
has compact range), so N - �T does also. By assumption, the wage
function w: [O,NJ � (0,1) is continuous, so by the Von Neumann 
Intersection Lemme, an equilibrium (w,N - X) exists. To prove 
uniqueness, let (\.;' ,N - X') be another equilibrium, and suppose 
W' F w. 
-· 
If w • > w then N - X • N - X since w is a strictly 
- - -
decreasing function, so X < X'. But by Lemma 2 XT(w') � !T(w), so
X' @ YT<w') implies that x• i XT<w> i x. a contradiction. Similarly,
we cannot have w' < w, so w' = w. And, since w is strictly 
decreasing, X • = if. QED 
1. 
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NOTES 
In the standard optimal taxation framework--e. g., Mirrlees [4] -­
workers respond to taxes by substituting untaxed leisure for 
taxable work effort. If we think of untaxed work effort as 
"leisure" the structure above is essentially the same, except for 
the utility function. If we denote leisure or untaxed work 
effort by l. the implicit utility fUnction in our model is (any 
strictly increasing, strictly concave transformation of): 
u(y,l) = y + w · 1. 
where y is after-tax consumption or income and w is the tax-
shel tered wage vote. In Mirrlees' notation, consumption is x and 
time worked is y = 1 - 1/n, so this would become
u(x,y) = x + wn(l - y). 
Evidently x and y are perfect substitutes in consumption; this 
utility function violates Mirrlees' assumptions ([4] , p. 1 76) by 
tending to wn(l - y) 2. 0, not to -m, as x -7 O+ and as y -7 1 -, 
so behaves quite differently from his. 
2. The results of section 4 of [3] , concerning the preferences over
schedules by "selfish" individuals interested in maximizing their
own after-tax consumption, do require some qualification. Within
the present class of admissable schedules, an individual of type
n will typically prefer a schedule with a discontinuity
(downward) at n. If admissable schedules are required to be 
non-decreasing functions of income, however, the individually
optimal simple schedules will still be of the form given by 
Proposition 4. 2 of [3] , if G ! O. (For G > 0, the preferred 
schedules for large n cannot be constant for all x < n, because 
of the feasiblity constraint T(x) � x, all x, so will have a 
segment of positive slope for low income levels.) 
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